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Abstract: Parochial altruism—a preference for altruistic behavior towards ingroup members and mis-
trust or hostility towards outgroup members—is a pervasive feature in human society and strongly
shapes the enforcement of social norms. Since the uniqueness of human society critically depends on
the enforcement of norms, the understanding of the neural circuitry of the impact of parochial altruism
on social norm enforcement is key, but unexplored. To ﬁll this gap, we measured brain activity with
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while subjects had the opportunity to punish ingroup
members and outgroup members for violating social norms. Findings revealed that subjects’ strong
punishment of defecting outgroup members is associated with increased activity in a functionally con-
nected network involved in sanction-related decisions (right orbitofrontal gyrus, right lateral prefrontal
cortex, right dorsal caudatus). Moreover, the stronger the connectivity in this network, the more out-
group members are punished. In contrast, the much weaker punishment of ingroup members who
committed the very same norm violation is associated with increased activity and connectivity in the
mentalizing-network (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, bilateral temporo-parietal junction), as if subjects
tried to understand or justify ingroup members’ behavior. Finally, connectivity analyses between the
two networks suggest that the mentalizing-network modulates punishment by affecting the activity in
the right orbitofrontal gyrus and right lateral prefrontal cortex, notably in the same areas showing
enhanced activity and connectivity whenever third-parties strongly punished defecting outgroup mem-
bers. Hum Brain Mapp 00:000–000, 2011. VC 2011 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
The uniqueness of human society is critically dependent
on the development, compliance, and enforcement of ele-
mentary social norms and the associated altruistic behav-
ior [Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003, 2004a]. For instance,
humans are willing to punish violators of social norms
even at substantial personal costs [Boyd et al., 2003; Fehr
and Ga¨chter, 2002; Henrich, 2006]. A key element of the
enforcement of many social norms, such as food-sharing
norms in hunter-gatherer societies [Hill, 2002; Kaplan
et al., 2000], is that people punish norm violators not only
for direct transgressions against the punisher himself
(termed second-party punishment), but also for norm vio-
lations against others (termed third-party punishment)
[Bendor and Swistak, 2001; Sober and Wilson, 1998]. Norm
enforcement requires that even third parties—who are nei-
ther economically, physically, nor psychologically affected
by the violations—be willing to punish [Fehr and Fisch-
bacher, 2004b; Henrich et al., 2006]. Thus, third-party pun-
ishment greatly enhances the scope for norms that
regulate human behavior. In fact, some researchers view
the existence of third-party sanctions as the decisive factor
for the enforcement of social norms in human society
because second-party punishment strategies are not evolu-
tionarily stable, while strategies involving third-party sanc-
tions are stable [Bendor and Swistak, 2001].
Experimental evidence from laboratory [Brewer, 1979;
Chen and Li, 2009; Kinzler et al., 2007; Koopmans and
Rebers, 2009; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971]
and ﬁeld studies [Bernhard et al., 2006; Fehr et al., 2008;
Goette et al., 2006] demonstrates that parochial altruism
strongly shapes the compliance and enforcement of social
norms. Parochial altruism constitutes a persuasive psycho-
logical phenomenon which is qualiﬁed by a preference for
altruistic behavior towards the members of one’s ethnic,
racial, or any other social group, combined with a tend-
ency for indifference, mistrust, or even hostility toward
outgroup members [Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002].
For example, a recent third-party punishment experiment
in Papua New Guinea revealed strong favoritism toward a
subject’s own linguistic group in giving to others, and sig-
niﬁcantly greater punishment of individuals from another
linguistic group (in comparison to those from the subject’s
own group) who committed a norm violation toward the
subject’s ingroup members [Bernhard et al., 2006]. The im-
portance of parochial altruism for the understanding of
human society is corroborated by recent theoretical and
experimental research that has closely tied outgroup hos-
tility to the evolution of human prosociality within groups
[Boyd et al., 2003; Choi and Bowles, 2007] and prosociality
within groups (ingroup favoritism) to the evolution of cul-
tural groups [Efferson et al., 2008].
In view of the importance of third-party punishment for
the enforcement of social norms, its parochial and altruis-
tic nature, and the evidence for the coevolution of parochi-
alism, altruism, and cultural groups, we conjecture that
humans have developed elaborate neural mechanisms for
social cognition that modulate third-parties’ norm enforce-
ment behavior dependent on the group afﬁliation of the
norm violator and his or her victim. Although recent stud-
ies have fundamentally improved our knowledge of how
the brain modulates norm compliance [Baumgartner et al.,
2008, 2009; Delgado et al., 2005; Harbaugh et al., 2007;
King-Casas et al., 2005; Rilling et al., 2002; Spitzer et al.,
2007] and norm enforcement [Buckholtz et al., 2008; de
Quervain et al., 2004; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Knoch
et al., 2006, 2008; Rangel et al., 2008; Sanfey, 2007; Sanfey
et al., 2003; Strobel et al., 2011] they do not examine the
parochial nature of this phenomena. There is also an im-
portant literature examining the neural circuitry of the
cognitions involved in the evaluation of faces from distinct
races [Cunningham et al., 2004; Golby et al., 2001; Phelps
et al., 2000], the judgment of people belonging to other
races [Eberhardt, 2005; Freeman et al., 2010; Ito and Bar-
tholow, 2009; Lieberman et al., 2005; Richeson et al., 2003],
prejudice [Beer et al., 2008], the evaluation of very poor
and ‘‘disgusting’’ outgroups such as addicts and beggars
in dirty clothes [Harris and Fiske, 2006], and the general
evaluation of ingroup–outgroup interactions [Mathur
et al., 2010; Van Bavel et al., 2008] but none of the individ-
uals in these studies had to make costly punishment deci-
sions that involved real costs and beneﬁts for themselves
or for others. In these studies there was thus no trade off
between the individual punisher’s self-interest, which sug-
gests that he should not punish at all, and the punisher’s
altruistic concerns, which suggest that he should protect
the victim of norm violations. It is exactly this willingness
to incur the cost of altruistic norm enforcement which ren-
ders altruistic third-party punishment a powerful evolu-
tionary force ([Bendor and Swistak, 2001; Sober and
Wilson, 1998].
By using a third-party punishment paradigm [Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2004b] with manipulation of group member-
ship (in/outgroup) [Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al.,
2006], the involvement of real monetary stakes, and the
requirement to curb immediate self-interests in order to
enforce a social norm, this study is the ﬁrst to uncover the
neural circuitry of parochial altruism and its impact on the
enforcement of social norms. For that purpose, we
exploited the fact that individuals are randomly assigned
to real social groups (platoons) during a four-week phase
of ofﬁcer training in the Swiss Army. During this training
course, ofﬁcer candidates interact almost exclusively with
members of their own platoon and social ties within the
platoon form very quickly (for details see Method section).
The applied third-party punishment paradigm consists of
two decision stages—one conducted during the third or
fourth week of the training course and one conducted in
the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner
immediately after the end of the training course (within 5
days). All interactions were anonymous and one-shot.
During the ﬁrst decision stage, the ofﬁcer candidates
played a simultaneous Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG).
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Two Players A and B were each endowed with 20 points
and had to decide simultaneously whether to keep the
points or pass all of them to the other player. Passed
points were doubled. Thus, keeping the points equals
defection (denoted as D throughout the paper) and pass-
ing the points equals cooperation (denoted as C through-
out the paper). For example, if A retained the 20 points
while B transferred the 20 points (behavioral pattern DC),
then A earned a total of 60 points (40 points from the
transfer and plus the original 20 points) and B earned
nothing. Thus, irrespective of what the other player did, a
player in the ﬁrst-stage was always better off if he kept
the endowment for himself, but if both players kept their
endowments they only earned 20 points each (behavioral
pattern DD), whereas if they both cooperated and trans-
ferred their endowments, each earned 40 points (behav-
ioral pattern CC).
During the second decision stage, some of the ofﬁcer
candidates (16 subjects) were invited to the fMRI scanner
and received the opportunity, in the role of a third-party
(Player C), to punish Player A’s or Player B’s behavior by
assigning punishment points. For that purpose, Player C
received an endowment of 10 points at the beginning of
each punishment trial (30 trials in total, in each of which
Player C faced the previous decisions of different Players
A and B), which C could use to ﬁnance the assignment of
punishment points. Assigning one punishment point cost
Player C one point and cost the sanctioned player three
points. Importantly, Player C only could punish the behav-
ior of one Player (either A or B) during each of the played
punishment trials. In order to simplify the nomenclature,
we recoded all Player C’s decisions in such a way that A
always refers to the player that C can punish, while B
always refers to the player that C cannot punish. Please
note that all players (Players A, B, and C) were paid
according to their decisions and those of their interaction
partners. Thus, no deception of the subjects occurred in
this study.
As we wanted to examine the neural circuitry of paro-
chial altruism, third-parties in the fMRI scanner were con-
fronted with the following three group constellations: (1)
All three players in the game are from the same platoon
(group constellation ABC, depicted in green color through-
out the paper). (2) Only Players A and C are from the
same platoon, while Player B is an outgroup member
(group constellation AC, depicted in blue color throughout
the paper). (3) Only Players B and C are from the same
platoon, while Player A is an outgroup member (group
constellation BC, depicted in red color throughout the pa-
per). Because Player C (the third-party) and Player A (who
can be punished, see above) are from the same group in
the group constellations ABC and AC, we will in the fol-
lowing refer to these two group constellations as ingroup
constellations. In contrast, we will refer to the group con-
stellation BC as outgroup constellation because here Player
C (the third-party) and Player A (who can be punished,
see above) are from different groups. Please see Figure 1
for a summary of the design and an example of a decision
screen the third-parties saw during the scanning session.
Based on the discussed behavioral literature [Bernhard
et al., 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004b; Goette et al.,
2006], we expect third-parties to show a parochial punish-
ment pattern, qualiﬁed by a particular strong impact of
group membership on punishment decisions in the DC
condition, when Player A defects and Player B cooperates.
In detail, we hypothesize that outgroup members who
defect against cooperating ingroup members are punished
much more severely than ingroup members who commit
the same norm violation—a hypothesis the behavioral
analyses strongly conﬁrm (see results section for details).
The key question this study therefore allows to answer is
which brain circuits modulate this highly distinctive paro-
chial punishment pattern.
Recent neuroimaging studies on second-party norm
enforcement suggest that two brain regions in particular
play a decisive and functionally distinctive role in punish-
ment-related decision processes; these are the right lateral
PFC [Knoch et al., 2006, 2008; Sanfey et al., 2003] and the
dorsal caudatus [de Quervain et al., 2004; Seymour et al.,
2007]. Evidence from transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) [Knoch et al., 2006; van ’t Wout et al., 2005] and
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) [Knoch
et al., 2008] studies suggests that the right lateral PFC is
causally involved in (costly) norm enforcement behavior
by modulating the weight of self-interest in the decision
process. On the other hand, punishment-related activity in
the dorsal caudatus (a brain region strongly implicated in
the processing of rewards that accrue as a result of goal-
directed actions [Fliessbach et al., 2007; Kawagoe et al.,
1998; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Schultz and Romo, 1988]) in
combination with behavioral and questionnaire measures
suggests that people derive satisfaction from punishing
norm violators [de Quervain et al., 2004; Singer et al.,
2006]. We expect similar processes and associated brain ac-
tivity patterns in the right lateral PFC and the dorsal cau-
datus when third-parties strongly punish outgroup
members (for defecting against cooperating ingroup mem-
bers). Similar to second-parties, third-parties in our para-
digm also have to modulate the weight of self-interest in
the punishment decision—a decision process which activ-
ity in the dorsal caudatus might also reinforce and
motivate.
In addition to similar processes assumed to be necessary
for the implementation of both second- and third-party
punishment behaviors, we expect that the parochial nature
of altruistic norm enforcement requires further psychologi-
cal and cognitive processes and associated brain activity
patterns, as the very same norm violation incurs much
more severe punishment when an outgroup member is the
perpetrator. We assume that at least two additional key
processes must take place in the third-party brain in order
to mediate such a highly distinctive punishment behavior.
First, we expect the very same norm violation to be eval-
uated differentially dependent on the norm violator’s
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group afﬁliation, that is more negatively when an out-
group member is the norm violator and/or more posi-
tively when an ingroup member commits the very same
norm violation. If this hypothesis is correct, we would
expect a differential activity pattern in those regions of the
brain strongly associated with a decision-relevant reﬂective
evaluation process, including in particular ventral and lat-
eral regions of the orbitofrontal gyrus (OFG) [Hare et al.,
2009; Kringelbach 2005; Liu et al., 2007; Plassmann et al.,
2007; Rangel et al., 2008]. More precisely, there is some
evidence for a medial-lateral distinction in the OFG, such
that activity in medial areas is related to positive evalua-
tion processes, while activity in lateral areas is related to
negative evaluation processes [Kringelbach, 2005; Liu
et al., 2007; Rilling et al., 2007; Spitzer et al., 2007]. We
thus hypothesize that the increased negative evaluation of
outgroup members’ norm violations might be associated
with increased activity in lateral areas of the OFG.
Second, we expect this group-dependent evaluation pro-
cess and associated highly distinctive punishment pattern
to be associated with a mentalizing process that attempts
to justify these highly distinctive punishment decisions. In
particular, we assume that a process must be executed in
the third-party brain that justiﬁes the very lenient punish-
ment of ingroup member’s defective behavior. Such a jus-
tiﬁcation process might include the search for mitigating
reasons or personality characteristics that may be able to
excuse the defective behavior. Thus, third-parties may try
to understand the underlying reasons and intentions of
ingroup member’s defective behavior and may conse-
quently ﬁnd a justiﬁcation for the defective act. If this hy-
pothesis is correct, we would expect to ﬁnd increased
activity in the mentalizing network of the brain, including
the dorsomedial PFC (DMPFC) and the bilateral temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ), because this kind of psychological
processes—inferring temporary goals, intentions, desires
as well as more enduring dispositions of others—have
been strongly and consistently associated with this brain
network [Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Van Overwalle, 2009].
Finally, if the assumed mentalizing/justiﬁcation process
indeed occurs in the third-party brain, resulting in a
reduced negative evaluation and associated reduced pun-
ishment behavior, we would expect the areas of the men-
talizing network to be functionally connected with the
Figure 1.
Design and decision screen. A: Depicted is the third-party pun-
ishment paradigm with group manipulation (ingroup/outgroup).
During Stage 1, which took place in the training course of the
Swiss army, Player A and Player B (ofﬁcer candidates) played a
simultaneous Prisoners’ Dilemma Game (PD), in which they
were free to decide whether to cooperate (transfer the points)
or to defect (keep the points). During Stage 2, which took place
in the fMRI-scanner, some of the ofﬁcer candidates in the role
of a third-party (Player C) were confronted with the decisions
of Player A and B and had the opportunity to assign (costly)
punishment points to one of the players. For that purpose,
Player C was endowed with 10 points for each judgment trial.
One point assigned for punishment reduced the income of the
punished player by three points. Note that we recoded all of
Player C’s decisions in such a way that A always refers to the
player that C can punish, whereas B always refers to the player
that C cannot punish. Crucially, Player A (whom C could punish)
was either from the same group/platoon as Player C, as in the
group constellations ABC (in green color) and AC (in blue
color), or was from a different group/platoon as in the group
constellation BC (in red color). Thus, ABC and AC are ingroup
constellations, whereas BC is an outgroup constellation. B:
Depicted is an example for a decision screen third-parties saw
during the scanning session. In this particular case, third-parties
were confronted with the outgroup constellation BC and an
outgroup member who defected against a cooperating ingroup
member. The group afﬁliation of Player A and B was indicated
both verbally (other group/your group) and schematically (in
black or gray color). Please note that we reversed the color for
the schematic depiction of ingroup and outgroup members and
the punishment scale (9 6 3 0 instead of 0 3 6 9) for half of the
subjects.
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punishment-related areas in the ventral and lateral PFC
and/or dorsal caudatus. More precisely, if the mentaliz-
ing/justiﬁcation network is indeed recruited to reduce the
punishment of ingroup members’ defective behavior, we
would expect to ﬁnd evidence that the mentalizing
network controls/downregulates the areas involved in
punishment-related decision processes.
Taken together, we hypothesize that the parochial na-
ture of altruistic norm enforcement in the third-party brain
is orchestrated by functionally connected brain areas
involved in modulating the weight of economics self-inter-
ests (right LPFC), the motivational aspect of punishment
(dorsal caudatus), negative and positive evaluation (OFG)
and mentalizing (DMPFC, bilateral TPJ) processes. More
precisely, we hypothesize that (1) the increased punish-
ment of defecting outgroup members is associated with
increased activity and connectivity in brain areas known
to play key and functionally distinct roles in punishment-
related decision processes (lateral OFG, lateral PFC and
caudatus). In sharp contrast, we expect that (2) the
reduced punishment of defecting ingroup members is
associated with increased activity and connectivity in key
areas of the mentalizing network (DMPFC, TPJ). Finally,
we hypothesize that (3) the mentalizing network might ac-
complish this reduced punishment of ingroup members by
modulating/down-regulating the activity in parts of the
punishment network.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
A total of 16 healthy, right-handed male subjects (mean
age  s.d., 24.5  2.2, max: 27, min: 20) participated in the
fMRI-study. None of the participants had to be excluded
from the analyses. All subjects were free of chronic dis-
eases, mental disorders, medication, and drug or alcohol
abuse. The study was carried out in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki principles and approved by the
institutional ethics committee. All subjects gave written,
informed consent and were informed of their right to dis-
continue participation at any time.
Group Manipulation: Real Social Groups
All 16 subjects who took part in the fMRI experiment
were completing a four-week phase of ofﬁcer training in
the Swiss army at the time of the experiment. This training
course brings ofﬁcer candidates from all branches of serv-
ice together to the same location in order to promote
exchanges of perspective among different branches of
service. Training involves mainly coursework on principles
of security, combat in large military units, logistics, and
leadership. Important for the investigation of the impact of
group membership on social norm enforcement, the ofﬁcer
candidates are randomly assigned to platoons (groups) at
the beginning of the training course. This random assign-
ment mechanism is ideal for the experimental paradigm in
several ways (for details see Goette et al. [2006]). First,
trainees know that platoon composition is identical and
that none of the ofﬁcers could choose which platoon to
join. Statistical tests reveal no signiﬁcant differences in pla-
toon composition with respect to branch of service, educa-
tion, or age. Second, there is no competition between the
groups for evaluations or other resources. Third, despite
random assignment to platoons, social ties form very
quickly. Ofﬁcers indicated in a questionnaire that they
spent signiﬁcantly more time off duty with members of
their own platoon. Thus, the ofﬁcer candidates interact
almost exclusively with members of their own platoon,
both during on-duty and off-duty time.
Design
We applied a third-party punishment paradigm [Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004b] with group manipulation [Bern-
hard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006] consisting of two deci-
sion stages, one conducted in the training course of the
Swiss army and one conducted in the fMRI scanner. The
subjects knew in all stages of the experiment that there
were no repeated interactions and that all interactions
were conducted in complete anonymity. During the ﬁrst
decision stage conducted in the training course of the
Swiss army, the ofﬁcer candidates played (in the role of
Player A and B) a simultaneous Prisoners’ Dilemma game,
where they could decide either to cooperate or defect.
Thus, four behavioral patterns are possible: Player A and
B cooperate (CC), Player A and B defect (DD), Player A
cooperate and Player B defects (CD), and Player A defects
and Player B cooperates (DC). Player A and B knew that
other ofﬁcer candidates from the same training course
would be confronted with their decisions, and that they
would receive the opportunity to judge their behavior in
the role of a third-party (Player C) by assigning deduc-
tion/punishment points. In total, 16 ofﬁcer candidates
were invited to take part in this second decision stage con-
ducted in the fMRI-scanner, where they were confronted
with 30 decisions stemming from different Players A and
B. At the beginning of each punishment trial, they
received an endowment of 10 points which they could ei-
ther keep or use to punish Player A. One point assigned
for punishment reduced the punished player’s income by
three points. Points not used for punishment were
exchanged into real money and paid to Player C at the
end of the experiment (for details on exchange rate please
see below). Player C was always informed about the group
afﬁliation of Player A and B, that is whether the players
were from his own or another platoon (in/outgroup
manipulation). There are three group constellations in the
experiment; two ingroup constellations (ABC, AC), where
Player A (who can be punished by C) is from his own pla-
toon and one outgroup constellation (BC), where Player A
(who can be punished by C) is from another platoon.
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Subjects were paid according to their decisions (Player
A, B, and C) and the decisions of their interaction partners
(Player A and B). While Players A and B received their
money per mail shortly after the scanning session was
conducted, Player C was immediately paid at the end of
the scanning session. The exchange rate was as follows: 10
points ¼ 2 Swiss Francs, that is about $ 2.
Subjects read written instructions describing the details
of the paradigm, including the payoff rules, prior to both
decision stages in the Swiss army training course and in
the fMRI scanner. After the subjects had read the instruc-
tions, we checked whether they understood the payoff
rules and the treatment conditions by means of several hy-
pothetical questions. All subjects answered the control
questions correctly.
Procedure in the Scanner
The computer screens that the third-parties needed to see
during the punishment trials (see Fig. 1 for an example)
were presented with a video projector onto a translucent
screen that subjects viewed inside the scanner via a mirror.
On these judgment screens, Players A and B were repre-
sented by schematic pictures of two humans whose coloring
in gray or black indicated the players0 group afﬁliation. In
half of the subjects, gray indicated an ingroup member and
black an outgroup member, while the coloring for ingroup
and outgroup members was reversed for the other half of
the subjects. In addition to the coloring, the players’ group
afﬁliation was depicted verbally (your group/other group).
Finally, the players’ behavior, that is whether these players
defected (kept the points) or cooperated (transferred the
points) was also depicted verbally. After this information on
group afﬁliation and behavior was presented for 4 s, 4 but-
tons representing the four punishment options were pre-
sented on the same screen, indicating that the subjects could
now implement their punishment decisions, by means of a
4-button input device. In half of the subjects, these punish-
ment options were presented with a scale ranging from 0 to
9 deduction points (0/3/6/9) and in the other half of sub-
jects, the punishment scale was reversed (9/6/3/0). On av-
erage, punishment decisions were implemented 6.92
seconds (standard error: 0.36) after the onset of the judg-
ment screen. After pressing the button, the judgment deci-
sion remained on the screen for another 2 s and was then
replaced by a ﬁxation cross, which separated the punish-
ment trials by 14 s.
The software package z-Tree [Fischbacher, 2007], a pro-
gram for conducting behavioral experiments in combina-
tion with neuroimaging, was used for presenting screens
and for collecting behavioral and timing data.
Behavioral Analyses
To analyze third-parties’ punishment levels, we ﬁrst cal-
culated an average punishment level for each condition (3
group constellations  4 behavioral patterns). We then
used the statistical software package SPSS 15 for PC (SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL) for the different analyses of the behav-
ioral data. Please see results section for details about the
statistical tests conducted, including paired t-tests, simple
t-tests, and repeated measures ANOVA with within-sub-
jects factor group constellation (BC, AC, ABC) and behav-
ioral patterns (CC, CD, DC, DD). Results were considered
signiﬁcant at the level of P < 0.05 (two-tailed). In case of a
signiﬁcant multivariate effects, post hoc paired t-tests were
computed using the Bonferroni correction according to
Holm [1979]. As effect size measure ETA2 is reported.
fMRI Analyses: IMAGE Acquisition
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla Philips
Intera whole body MR Scanner (Philips Medical Systems,
Best, The Netherlands) equipped with an 8-channel Philips
SENSE head coil. Structural image acquisition consisted of
180 T1-weighted transversal images (0.75 mm slice thick-
ness). For functional imaging, a total of 280 volumes were
obtained using a SENSitivity Encoded (SENSE; [Pruess-
mann et al., 1999]) T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging
sequence with an acceleration factor of 2.0. 40 axial slices
were acquired covering the whole brain with a slice thick-
ness of 3 mm; no inter-slice gap; interleaved acquisition;
TR ¼ 3,000 ms; TE ¼ 35ms; ﬂip angle ¼ 77, ﬁeld of view
¼ 220 mm; matrix size ¼ 128  128. We used a tilted ac-
quisition in an oblique orientation at 30 to the AC-PC line
in order to optimize functional sensitivity in orbitofrontal
cortex and medial temporal lobes.
fMRI Analyses: Preprocessing
For the preprocessing and statistical analyses, the statis-
tical parametric mapping software package (SPM5, Well-
come Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK)
implemented in Matlab (Version 7) were used. For analy-
sis, all images were realigned to the ﬁrst volume, corrected
for motion artifacts and time of acquisition within a TR,
normalized (3  3  3 mm3) into standard stereotaxic
space (template provided by the Montreal Neurological
Institute), and smoothed using an 8 mm full-width-at-half-
maximum Gaussian kernel. A band-pass ﬁlter composed
of a discrete cosine-basis function with a cut-off period of
128 s for the high-pass ﬁlter was applied. To increase sig-
nal to noise ratio, global intensity changes were minimized
by scaling each image to the grand mean.
fMRI Analyses: General Linear Model
We performed random-effects analyses on the functional
data for the punishment period. For that purpose, we
deﬁned a general linear model (GLM) with the following
regressors of interests: three group constellations (BC, AC,
ABC)  4 behavioral patterns (CC, CD, DC, DD). The
length of each of these regressors was individually mod-
eled from the onset of the punishment trials until the
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subject’s button press. All regressors were convolved with
a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The
six scan-to-scan motion parameters produced during
realignment were included as additional regressors in the
SPM analysis to account for residual effects of scan to scan
motion.
For second-level random effects analysis, the single-sub-
ject Beta-estimates were entered into a repeated-measures
of ANOVA with within-subject factor group constellations
(BC, AC, ABC) and within-subject factor behavioral pat-
terns (CC, CD, DC, DD). Because of the fact that the study
was speciﬁcally designed to reveal the parochial nature of
altruistic norm enforcement, we focused on the DC trials
in our analyses of the brain activity pattern, where we
observed, as expected, the strongest parochial punishment
pattern. All other behavioral trials (CC, CD, DD) were pri-
marily used in the analyses to demonstrate the speciﬁcity
of the parochial activity pattern during the DC condition.
To reveal the neural underpinnings of the parochial
punishment pattern, we focused on the following two
brain contrast:
• DC trials only: Outgroup (BC) minus Ingroup
(AC+ABC)weighted
• DC trials only: Ingroup (AC+ABC)weighted minus Out-
group (BC)
The ﬁrst brain contrast allowed us to test our hypothesis
that the increased punishment of defecting outgroup mem-
bers is associated with increased activity in brain areas
known to play key and functionally distinct roles in punish-
ment-related decision processes (lateral OFG, lateral PFC,
and caudatus). The second brain contrast allowed us to test
our hypothesis that the reduced punishment of defecting
ingroup members is associated with increased activity in
key areas of the mentalizing network (DMPFC, TPJ):
To increase the speciﬁcity of the ﬁndings during these DC
trials only contrasts, we exclusively masked them at P < 0.05
with the same group constellation contrast (Outgroup minus
Ingroup and vice versa, respectively), but calculated with
trials where Player A (whom C can punish) shows a cooper-
ative behavioral pattern (CC, CD). This masking procedure
excludes all regions (at P < 0.05) that show an unspeciﬁc
main effect of group membership. In other words, we report
in these DC trials only contrasts brain areas, which are dif-
ferentially activated solely when third-parties demonstrate a
highly distinctive parochial punishment pattern.
Although not the main aim of the current manuscript,
we calculated the following two additional contrasts in
order to reveal the brain areas demonstrating a main effect
of group membership, including those trials where no
(CC, CD) or only a marginal (DD) parochial punishment
pattern was expected and found (see Supporting Informa-
tion analysis S1):
• All behavioral trials: Outgroup (BC) minus Ingroup
(AC+ABC)weighted
• All behavioral trials: Ingroup (AC+ABC) weighted minus
Outgroup (BC)
fMRI-Analyses: Statistical Inferences
We report results in a priori regions of interests (previ-
ously deﬁned in neuroimaging studies on punishment
[Buckholtz et al., 2008; de Quervain et al., 2004; Knoch
et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003; Spitzer et al., 2007; Strobel
et al., 2011] and mentalizing [Van Overwalle 2009]): OFG,
right lateral PFC, caudatus, DMPFC, TPJ where activations
are signiﬁcant at P < 0.005 uncorrected for multiple com-
parisons with an extent threshold of 10 voxels [Lieberman
and Cunningham, 2009], and survive small volume correc-
tions (SVC) for multiple comparisons (or family-wise error
[FWE] corrections across the whole brain). The SVC proce-
dure, as implemented in SPM5 using the FWE correction
procedure (P < 0.05), allows results to be corrected for
multiple nonindependent comparisons with a deﬁned
region of interest. For the SVC procedure, we used ana-
tomical masks (lateral OFG, caudatus) obtained from the
WFU PickAtlas toolbox [Maldjian et al., 2003], and 20 mm
spheres centered on coordinates derived from previous
work. For the areas of the mentalizing network, we used a
recently published meta-analysis [Van Overwalle, 2009] on
social cognition to deﬁne the peaks in the lTPJ (x ¼ 49,
y ¼ 58, z ¼ 22), rTPJ (x ¼ 53, y ¼ 54, z ¼ 22), and
DMPFC (x ¼ 3, y ¼ 48, z ¼ 30), which consisted of the
average coordinates of those mentalizing tasks (including
goal, intention and trait inferences, and morality judg-
ments) consistently activating these brain areas. For the
punishment-related activated in the rLPFC, we averaged
the peak coordinates of a second-party norm enforcement
study (x ¼ 40, y ¼ 36, z ¼ 22) [Sanfey et al., 2003] where
disruption by rTMS [Knoch et al., 2006] or tDCS [Knoch
et al., 2008] reduces subject’s ability to control their eco-
nomic self-interest. Activations in other regions were only
considered signiﬁcant if they survived whole-brain FWE
correction for multiple comparisons at P < 0.05 (in line
with established procedures [Frackowiak et al., 2004]), but
are reported for completeness at a threshold of P < 0.005
uncorrected for multiple comparisons. Reported voxels
conform to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordi-
nate space. The right side of the brain is displayed on the
right side in our illustrations.
fMRI-Analyses: ROI Analyses
To illustrate the speciﬁcity of the ﬁndings both with
regard to group constellations (BC, AC, ABC), behavioral
patterns (CC, CD, DC, DD), and lateralization effects, we
created either functional or spherical ROIs using the Mars-
BaR software. Functional ROIs encompassed all voxels that
were signiﬁcantly (P < 0.005) activated in the corresponding
contrast analyses, whereas spherical ROIs consisted of a 5
mm sphere around the peak of activity. The rule for apply-
ing spherical or functional ROI’s was as follows: For regions
with a voxel extent of 20 or more voxels (at P < 0.005), we
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created spherical ROIs (bilateral temporo-parietal-junction),
whereas we created functional ROIs for all other regions
with a voxel extent between 10 and 20 voxels (rOFG, rLPFC,
rCaudatus, DMPFC). Please note that the conducted statisti-
cal analyses (based on extracted Beta-estimates) do not sig-
niﬁcantly change if we apply the same ROI type for all
regions, either functional or spherical.
To corroborate the ROI analyses described above, addi-
tional region of interests analyses were performed on ana-
tomical or spherical ROIs deﬁned by prior studies. The
advantage of this approach is that the deﬁnition of ROIs is
independent of the ﬁndings in the present study and thus
less biased. To conduct these ROI analyses, we applied the
same independent ROIs as we had used for the small vol-
ume family-wise-error corrections (described in detail
above, please see statistical inference). Importantly, the
ﬁndings of the two ROI-analyses do not differ. In particu-
lar, the speciﬁcity of the parochial activity pattern reported
for the DC condition was corroborated, since there was no
impact of group membership on these regions during co-
operative behavioral decisions (all P > 0.25).
fMRI-Analyses: Physio-Physiological
Interaction Analyses
To reveal the functional connectivity between brain
areas orchestrating the parochial nature of altruistic norm
enforcement, we applied Physio-Physiological Interaction
(PPI) analyses [Friston et al., 1997], which elucidate the
inﬂuence that one neuronal system exerts over another
(termed effective connectivity). For that purpose, we
extracted mean-corrected and high-pass ﬁltered time series
of the rOFG, the rCaudatus, the DMPFC, and the left TPJ
from a 5 mm spherical ROI around the peak of activation
derived from the DC trials only contrasts. Once these time
series were obtained for each subject, the interaction term
(referred to as ‘‘PPI regressor’’) was computed as the vec-
tor resulting from the element-by-element product of two
mean corrected time series. Based on our hypotheses and
the ﬁndings of the GLM analyses, we created the follow-
ing two interaction terms: interaction term of the time se-
ries of rOFG and rCaudatus as well as of the time series of
left TPJ and DMPFC. We used these two interaction terms
as regressors of interests in two independent ﬁrst level
analyses, with the two single time series included as
regressors of non-interests (either rOFG and rCaudatus or
DMPFC and left TPJ). Each subject’s Beta-estimates of the
two PPI regressors were then taken to random-effects
group analyses and entered into two one-sample t-tests.
We were particularly interested in answering the following
two questions in our analyses of these two PPI-regressors:
First, do we ﬁnd evidence in our data that the evaluation-
related area of the rOFG positively modulates the connec-
tivity between the rCaudatus and rLPFC, two areas
thought to be critically involved in implementing punish-
ment-related decision processes? Second, do we ﬁnd evi-
dence that one part of the mentalizing network in the left
TPJ negatively modulates the connectivity between the
other part of the mentalizing network in the DMPFC and
the areas involved in punishment-related decision proc-
esses, including the rOFG, rLPFC, and the rCaudatus?
Finally, we examined whether differences in functional
connectivity within areas of the mentalizing and punish-
ment network, respectively, can explain the individual dif-
ferences in punishment behavior during the DC condition.
For that purpose, we entered the Beta-estimates from the
single time-course regressors of the rOFG and DMPFC
(included as regressor of non-interests in the PPI analyses
described above) into two multiple regression analyses.
These regression analyses included the individual punish-
ment levels from the DC condition as covariates. More
precisely, we used third-parties’ individual punishment
level of defecting outgroup members to search for areas
within the punishment network whose connectivity with
the rOFG depends on the individual punishment level. In
contrast, we used third-parties’ individual punishment lev-
els of defecting ingroup members to search for areas
within the mentalizing network, where the connectivity
with the DMPFC depends on the individual punishment
level. In the former case, we expected a positive correla-
tion within the punishment network, whereas we expected
a negative correlation within the mentalizing network in
the latter case.
Because of strong a priori hypotheses, the signiﬁcant
thresholds for all connectivity analyses were set at P <
0.005 with a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels. For il-
lustrative purposes, we created functional ROIs using the
MarsBaR software by selecting all voxels that were sig-
niﬁcantly activated at P < 0.005 together with a cluster
extent threshold of 10 voxels in the corresponding
analyses.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results: Parochial
Punishment Patterns
Our main behavioral measure consists of each third-
party’s average punishment points, broken down into the
three group constellations (BC, AC, ABC) and four behav-
ior patterns based on Player A’s and B’s decision to coop-
erate or defect (CC, CD, DC, DD). On the basis of these
average punishment points, we calculated a two-way
repeated measures of ANOVA with within-subject factor
group constellation (BC, AC, ABC) and within-subject fac-
tor behavior (CC, CD, DC, DD). Results revealed signiﬁ-
cant main effects of group constellation [F(2,14) ¼ 5.36, P ¼
0.019, ETA2 ¼ 0.43] and behavior [F(3,13) ¼ 10.34, P ¼
0.001, ETA2 ¼ 0.71], as well as a signiﬁcant interaction
effect of group constellation  behavior [F(6,10) ¼ 4.20, P ¼
0.023, ETA2 ¼ 0.72]. As expected, these main and interac-
tion effects demonstrated the following behavioral punish-
ment pattern (see Fig. 2). Cooperative behavioral decisions
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by Player A (behavior patterns CC and CD) resulted in no
impact of group membership on punishment behavior
(paired t-test behavior CC: all P > 0.11; paired t-test behav-
ior CD: all P > 0.09). This was due to the fact that, irrespec-
tive of whether Player A was an outgroup or ingroup
member, he was not punished for a cooperative behavioral
decision (all simple t-tests versus 0: P > 0.11). In sharp con-
trast, when Player A defected and Player B cooperated
(behavior pattern DC), group membership had a strong
impact on punishment decisions. Outgroup members were
punished much more severely for defecting than ingroup
members (paired t-test: BC vs. AC: P < 0.000, ETA2 ¼ 0.63;
BC vs. ABC: P < 0.000, ETA2 ¼ 0.66). This effect of group
membership remained present when both players defected
(behavioral pattern DD). The magnitude of the group effect
was markedly reduced, however (paired t-test: BC vs. AC:
P ¼ 0.037, ETA2 ¼ 0.26, BC vs. ABC: P ¼ 0.069, ETA2 ¼
0.20), indicated by increased P-values and strongly reduced
effect size measures (ETA2). Finally, there was no signiﬁ-
cant difference in punishment behavior with respect to the
two ingroup constellations (paired t-test behavior DC: AC
vs. ABC: P ¼ 0.64; paired t-test behavior DD: AC vs. ABC:
P ¼ 0.10). Taken together, the analysis of the punishment
pattern revealed the expected parochial impact of group
membership on altruistic norm enforcement, which is par-
ticularly pronounced in the DC condition when outgroup
members defect against cooperating ingroup members.
fMRI Data: Outgroup Effects
In order to identify a functionally connected brain net-
work which explains the strong impact of group member-
ship on punishment behavior, we calculated in a ﬁrst
analysis the contrast outgroup (BC) minus ingroup
(ACþABC) constellations during the DC condition. The
resulting statistical parametric map (SPM, at P < 0.005,
voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, Lieberman and Cunning-
ham, 2009) mainly revealed increased activation in a
hypothesized network of brain regions which have been
shown to play key and functionally separated roles in
punishment-related decision processes [de Quervain et al.,
2004; Knoch et al., 2006, 2008; Kringelbach 2005; Sanfey
et al., 2003; Spitzer et al., 2007], including the right orbito-
frontal gyrus (rOFG, BA 11/47, x ¼ 33, y ¼ 39, z ¼ 9),
the right lateral prefrontal cortex (rLPFC, BA 44/45, x ¼
57, y ¼ 12, z ¼ 15), and the right dorsal caudatus (x ¼ 15,
y ¼ 24, z ¼ 9; Fig. 3, Supporting Information Table S1).
Importantly, all these a priori regions of interests also sur-
vive small volume (SV) family-wise-error (FWE) correc-
tions at P < 0.05 (see Method section for details), except
the dorsal caudatus which just falls short of the threshold
with P ¼ 0.057.
To corroborate the speciﬁcity of the ﬁndings in the
rOFG, rLPFC, and right caudatus with respect to both
lateralization pattern and condition effects, we conducted
further analyses using either functional or spherical ROIs
(see method section for details). First, we took a closer
look at the lateralization pattern. We found no effect of
group membership (BC vs. AC, BC vs ABC, AC vs
ABC) in the left hemisphere (paired t-tests in the DC
condition: OFG: all P > 0.23; LPFC: all P > 0.88; cauda-
tus: all P > 0.55). Furthermore, these three brain regions
were signiﬁcantly more engaged in the right than in the
left hemisphere in the DC condition (paired t-tests: OFG:
P ¼ 0.001; LPFC: P ¼ 0.05; caudatus: P ¼ 0.009), sug-
gesting that the punishment-related activation in the
OFG, LPFC, and caudatus are conﬁned to the right
hemisphere.
If the rOFG, rLPFC, and right caudatus are indeed
involved in the decision-making process which leads to an
increased punishment of defective outgroup member, then
these brain regions should not show a differential effect of
group membership for Player A’s cooperative decisions
(behavioral patterns CC, CD), when third-parties’ punish-
ment behavior is virtually absent. Consistent with these
assumption, the interaction effect of group constellation 
behavior was signiﬁcant in all these regions (all P < 0.01),
and we found no effect of group membership (BC vs AC,
BC vs ABC, AC vs ABC) on brain activity during these co-
operative decision patterns (paired t-tests: rOFG: all P >
0.46; rLPFC: all P > 0.11, right caudatus: all P > 0.46). Fur-
thermore, and in line with the markedly reduced differen-
ces in punishment behavior in the DD condition (see
Fig. 2), all but one differential effect of group membership
disappeared during the DD condition in these regions (all
Figure 2.
Punishment behavior. Analyses of third-parties’ punishment
behavior of Player A revealed, as expected, a strong impact of
group membership on punishment behavior when Player A
defected and Player B cooperated (DC), a weak effect when
both players defected (DD), and no signiﬁcant impact of group
membership when Player A cooperated (CC, CD). Thus, third-
parties’ punishment behavior revealed the expected parochial
pattern, qualiﬁed by increased punishment of outgroup members
and reduced punishment of ingroup members for the same de-
fective behavior.
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P > 0.23). The only exception concerns the rLPFC which
still shows enhanced activity (P ¼ 0.002) in the outgroup
constellation (BC) compared with one of the ingroup con-
stellations (AC).
So far, we have shown that the rOFG, rLPFC, and right
caudatus show a very similar and highly speciﬁc activity
pattern, which is restricted to the right hemisphere and
only present when third-parties strongly punish outgroup
members who defect against cooperating ingroup mem-
bers. Such an activity pattern suggests, but does not yet
provide evidence, that these regions actually form a func-
tionally connected network orchestrating punishment
behavior. In order to provide this evidence, we applied
PPI analyses [Friston et al., 1997], which elucidate the
inﬂuence that one neuronal system exerts over another
(termed effective connectivity, see Method section for
details). Findings revealed (at P < 0.005, voxel extent
threshold: 10 voxels) that activity in the rOFG positively
modulates the effective connectivity between the right cau-
datus and rLPFC. In other words, we found that the
higher the activity in the rOFG, the stronger the connectiv-
ity between right caudatus and rLPFC (Fig. 4A, for addi-
tional information and illustration please see Supporting
Information Discussion S1 and Fig. S3A)—a ﬁnding that
provides evidence that these three brain regions actually
form a functionally connected neural network orchestrat-
ing punishment behavior. This evidence was further corro-
borated by the observation (at P < 0.005, voxel extent
threshold: 10 voxels) that a neighboring part of the rLPFC
(BA 45/46, x ¼ 48, y ¼ 21, z ¼ 21) shows a positive con-
nectivity pattern with the rOFG which depends on the
punishment level. This means that the stronger third-par-
ties punish defecting outgroup members in the DC condi-
tion, the stronger is the positive connectivity between the
rOFG and the rLPFC (Fig. 4B).
fMRI Data: Ingroup Effects
Next, we reversed the contrast of the ﬁrst analysis and
wondered whether we ﬁnd increased activity in the
ingroup (ACþABC) minus the outgroup (BC) constella-
tions during the DC condition. Such a differential ﬁnding
Figure 3.
Outgroup effects: Punishment network. Depicted is the
increased activation in the brain (at P < 0.005, voxel extent
threshold: 10 voxels, activity in all regions survives small volume
family-wise-error (FWE) corrections at P < 0.05, except the
dorsal caudatus which just falls short of the threshold with P ¼
0.057, see Methods section for details) contrasting the outgroup
(BC) minus the ingroup (ACþABC) constellations, when Player
A defected and Player B cooperated (behavioral pattern DC).
Consistent with the increased punishment pattern in the out-
group condition (BC), increased activity was mainly found in
brain areas involved in punishment-related decision processes,
including (A) right orbitofrontal gyrus (BA 11/47, x ¼ 33, y ¼
39, z ¼ 9), (B) right lateral prefrontal cortex (BA 44/45, x ¼
57, y ¼ 12, z ¼ 15), and (C) right dorsal caudatus (x ¼ 15, y ¼
24, z ¼ 9). Bar plots representing contrast estimates (in/out-
group vs. baseline) of functional ROIs (see Method section for
details) revealed in accordance with the similar punishment pat-
tern that the two ingroup constellations (AC, ABC) show a
highly similar activity pattern (P > 0.25 for all paired t-tests
between the two ingroup constellations). Asterisks denote
increased activity compared with baseline at P < 0.05 (*), P <
0.01 (**), P < 0.005 (***), or P < 0.001 (****). Please see Sup-
porting Information Figure S1 for event-related BOLD time
courses of the depicted brain regions.
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in the brain would be a ﬁrst step in understanding the
neural processes behind the phenomenon in which
ingroup members incur much less severe punishment than
outgroup members for the same defective behavior. We
primarily found increased activity (at P < 0.005, voxel
extent threshold: 10 voxels, Lieberman and Cunningham,
2009) in three brain regions that are well-known to form a
neural network involved in mentalizing processes [Gal-
lagher and Frith, 2003; Rilling et al., 2004; Van Overwalle
2009], including dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC,
BA 9, x ¼ 6, y ¼ 54, z ¼ 30) and bilateral temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ, BA 39/40/22, left TPJ: x ¼ 45, y ¼ 60, z
¼ 21; right TPJ: x ¼ 57, y ¼ 60, z ¼ 30; Fig. 5, Supporting
Information Table S1). All these a priori regions of inter-
ests survive small volume family-wise-error (FWE) correc-
tions at P < 0.05 (see Method section for details).
To corroborate the speciﬁcity of the ﬁndings in the
DMPFC and bilateral TPJ, we conducted further analysis
using functional ROIs in the DMPFC and spherical ROIs
(5 mm radius) in the bilateral TPJ (see Method section for
details). If this mentalizing network is involved in reduc-
ing the punishment of defecting ingroup members, then
we should not observe a differential group effect in these
brain regions when third-parties face cooperative decisions
by Player A (CC, CD). Consistent with this hypothesis, the
interaction effect of group constellation  behavior was
signiﬁcant in all these regions (all P < 0.01) and we found
no evidence for an impact of group membership (BC vs.
AC, BC vs. ABC, AC vs. ABC) on the activity pattern in
these brain regions during cooperative decisions (paired t-
tests: DMPFC: all P > 0.24, left TPJ: all P > 0.32, right TPJ:
all P > 0.41).
Furthermore, we found that the functional connectivity
(see Method section) between two of the brain regions in
this mentalizing network (DMPFC and left TPJ) depends
on the third-parties’ punishment levels of defecting
ingroup members in the DC condition; the lower the
third-parties’ punishment level, the higher the functional
connectivity between these two brain regions (at P <
0.005, voxel extent: 12 voxels, Fig. 6). In other words, the
stronger the interaction between these two regions of the
mentalizing network, the less ingroup members are pun-
ished for defecting against cooperating outgroup members.
This ﬁnding provides additional evidence that this mental-
izing network is indeed recruited in order to reduce the
punishment of defecting ingroup members.
fMRI Data: Functional Connectivity Analysis
Between the Mentalizing Network and the
Punishment Network
So far, we have identiﬁed a functionally connected pun-
ishment-network in our analyses consisting of the rOFG,
rLPFC, and right caudatus. This network shows enhanced
activity and connectivity whenever third-parties strongly
punish outgroup members who defect against cooperating
ingroup members. On the other hand, third-parties punish
ingroup members far less for the same defective behavior,
which is associated with increased activity and connectiv-
ity in main areas of the mentalizing network consisting of
the DMPFC and bilateral TPJ. In a next analysis, we exam-
ined whether we ﬁnd evidence in our data that these two
Figure 4.
Connectivity analyses within the punishment network. A:
Physio-Physiological Interaction (PPI) analyses using the rOFG
and right caudatus as seed regions revealed evidence (at P <
0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels) that the rOFG posi-
tively modulates the functional connectivity between right cauda-
tus and rLPFC—notably in the same area of the rLPFC showing
increased activity when third-parties strongly punish outgroup
members who defect against cooperating ingroup members (the
same activation as illustrated in Fig. 3B). These highly speciﬁc
connectivity and activity patterns provide evidence for a func-
tionally connected neural network orchestrating punishment
behavior. Color coding: connectivity effect depicted in red, acti-
vation level effect depicted in yellow, overlap depicted in orange.
B: Connectivity analyses using the rOFG as seed region revealed
(at P < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels, in violet color)
that the functional connectivity between the rOFG and rLPFC
depends on third-parties’ punishment level, that is the higher
third-parties punish defecting outgroup members in the DC con-
dition, the stronger is the functional connectivity between these
two regions. The scatter plot depicts this effect using a func-
tional ROI of the rLPFC (BA 45/46, x ¼ 48, y ¼ 21, z ¼ 21). In
order to visualize the spatial proximity of all activation and con-
nectivity effects in the rLPFC, the same activity and connectivity
patterns described in (A) are also depicted here in (B) in the
same colors. For display purposes, all activation and connectivity
patterns in (A) and (B) are depicted at P < 0.01.
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neuronal networks are functionally connected. We
hypothesize that the mentalizing network might modulate
the activity in parts of the punishment network, thus ena-
bling third-parties to implement a reduced punishment
behavior for defecting ingroup members. We focused our
analysis in particular on the orbitofrontal gyrus because
we argue that third-parties observing defecting ingroup
members might start a justiﬁcation process in the mental-
izing network, which affects the evaluation process
assumed to take place in the OFG [Kringelbach, 2005; Liu
et al., 2007; Rangel et al., 2008]. To answer this question,
we applied PPI analyses [Friston et al., 1997] using two
areas of the mentalizing network as seed regions (DMPFC
and left TPJ, see Method section for details). Findings
revealed (at P < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels)
in good agreements with our hypotheses that the activity
in the left TPJ modulates the effective connectivity
between the DMPFC and areas of the OFG and rLPFC. In
particular, we found that the activity in the left TPJ posi-
tively modulates the functional connectivity between the
DMPFC and medial areas of the OFG (mOFG; BA 10/11, x
¼ 15, y ¼ 45, z ¼ 9) known to be involved in positive
evaluation processes [Kringelbach, 2005; Liu et al., 2007;
Rangel et al., 2008]. In stark contrast, activity in the left
TPJ negatively modulates the functional connectivity
between the DMPFC and lateral areas of the OFG (BA 10/
11, left: x ¼ 42, y ¼ 54, z ¼ 9, right: x ¼ 24, y ¼ 60, z ¼
6) and rLPFC (BA 45/46, x ¼ 54, y ¼ 36, z ¼ 15) (Fig.
7A,B; for additional information and illustration please see
Supporting Information Discussion S1 and Fig. S3B–D). In
other words, the higher the activity in the left TPJ, the
stronger is the positive connectivity between DMPFC and
mOFG, and the stronger is the negative connectivity
between the DMPFC and lateral areas of the OFG and
rLPFC. Notably, these negative connectivity effects are
localized in neighboring and overlapping areas of the OFG
and rLPFC shown to be involved in the punishment-
related decision process in the DC condition (depicted in
Figs. 3 and 4). Taken together, these ﬁndings support our
hypothesis that the mentalizing network might control the
activity in the punishment-network, in particular by affect-
ing the evaluation of the ingroup member’s defective
behavior. As a consequence, this reduced negative and/or
increased positive evaluation might enable third-parties to
Figure 5.
Ingroup effects: Mentalizing network. Depicted is the increased
activation in the brain (at P < 0.005, voxel extent threshold: 10
voxels; activity in all regions survives small volume family-wise-
error (FWE) corrections at P < 0.05, see Methods section for
details) contrasting the ingroup (ACþABC) minus the outgroup
(BC) constellations, when Player A defected and Player B coop-
erated (behavioral pattern DC). Increased activity was mainly
found in brain areas involved in mentalizing processes, including
(A) dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC; BA 9, x ¼ 6, y ¼
54, z ¼ 30), (B) left temporo-parietal junction (lTPJ, BA 39/40/
22, x ¼ 45, y ¼ 60, z ¼ 21) and (C) right temporo-parietal
junction (rTPJ, BA 39/40, x ¼ 57, y ¼ 60, z ¼ 30). Bar plots
(color coding as in Fig. 3, red ¼ outgroup BC, blue ¼ ingroup
AC, green ¼ ingroup ABC) representing contrast estimates (in/
outgroup vs. baseline) of functional or spherical ROIs (see
Method section for details) revealed in accordance with the sim-
ilar punishment pattern that the two ingroup constellations (AC,
ABC) show a highly similar activity pattern (P > 0.25 for all
paired t-tests between the two ingroup constellations). Asterisks
denote increased activity compared with baseline at P < 0.05
(*), P < 0.01 (**), P < 0.005 (***), or P < 0.001 (****). Please
see Supporting Information Figure S2 for event-related BOLD
time courses of the depicted brain regions.
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implement a reduced punishment for the same defective
behavior.
DISCUSSION
This study is the ﬁrst to explore the neural networks
involved in orchestrating the parochial nature of altruistic
norm enforcement—a pervasive psychological phenom-
enon, which has shaped the human society in decisive
ways [Bernhard et al., 2006; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Effer-
son et al., 2008]. Findings revealed that third-parties’ paro-
chial punishment pattern is modulated by functionally
connected neural networks previously shown to be
involved in negative and positive evaluation processes
(VLPFC, VMPFC, OFG), the weighting of economic self-
interests (rLPFC), the appetitive and motivational compo-
nent of punishment (right dorsal caudatus), and mentaliz-
ing processes (DMPFC, bilateral TPJ, for a summary of the
neural ﬁndings please see Fig. 8). In the following, we will
discuss the neural ﬁndings in detail.
The increased punishment of outgroup members who
defect against cooperating ingroup members was associated
with increased activity in two hypothesized areas in the
right lateral PFC and right dorsal caudatus, which have
been shown to play important and functionally distinctive
roles during the implementation of second-party punish-
ment decisions where the norm violation directly affects the
second-party punisher (in contrast to the third-party pun-
isher). Existing studies [Knoch et al., 2006, 2008; van ’t Wout
et al., 2005] have demonstrated that disrupting the function
of the control-related area of the right lateral PFC reduces
subjects’ willingness to punish a norm violation committed
intentionally, showing that the area is causally involved in
costly punishment behavior. Crucially, the fairness judg-
ment remained unaffected by the disruption of the PFC,
suggesting that the subjects’ ability to identify and emotion-
ally experience the norm violations were not compromised.
These ﬁndings thus imply that the subjects are less able to
implement costly punishment following disruption of the
function of the right lateral PFC, due to the lack of prefron-
tal-mediated modulation of economic self-interests. On the
other hand, the right dorsal striatum, a brain area strongly
implicated in reward processing [Delgado et al., 2003;
Fliessbach et al., 2007; Liu et al., 2007; O’Doherty et al.,
2004], has also been demonstrated to be activated during
second-party punishment decisions [de Quervain et al.,
2004], consistent with the view that this brain area motivates
and reinforces the punishment act. Taken together, the
increased activity of these two brain regions during both
second and third-party norm enforcement processes indi-
cates, as hypothesized, that the implementation of both sec-
ond and third-party punishment decisions rely on similar
neural circuitry. This interpretation is consistent with the
ﬁndings of a study on third-party punishment judgments of
ﬁctive norm violations [Buckholtz et al., 2008], where
increased activity in the right lateral PFC was found when
participants made judgments about the appropriate punish-
ment for norm transgressions committed intentionally
(rather than unintentionally).
We hypothesized that parochial punishment patterns
require the activation of further processes in the third-
parties’ brains because it is otherwise difﬁcult to explain
why third parties punish the very same norm violation
much more severely when an outgroup member (as
opposed to an ingroup member) commits the transgres-
sion. In particular, we conjectured that two key processes
must take place in third-party brains: First, a differential
evaluation of outgroup and ingroup members’ defective
behavior and, second, a mentalizing process which justi-
ﬁes this differential evaluation process. We predicted that
these additional mental processes will yield differential
activity and connectivity patterns across speciﬁc brain
regions that have been shown to be involved in (1) eval-
uative processes and (2) in mentalizing processes in pre-
vious studies.
Figure 6.
Connectivity analyses within the mentalizing network. A: Con-
nectivity analyses using the DMPFC as seed region revealed (at
P < 0.005, voxel extent threshold ¼ 10 voxels) that the func-
tional connectivity between the DMPFC and lTPJ depends on
third-parties’ punishment level, that is the less third-parties pun-
ish defecting ingroup members in the DC condition, the stron-
ger is the functional connectivity between these two regions.
This ﬁnding provides additional evidence that the mentalizing
network is recruited in order to reduce the punishment of
defecting ingroup members. Color coding: connectivity effect
depicted in red, activation level effect depicted in yellow (the
same activation as depicted in Fig. 5B), overlap depicted in or-
ange. B: The scatter plot visualizes the effect explained in (A)
using a functional ROI of the lTPJ (x ¼ 57, y ¼ 54, z ¼ 24).
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The ﬁrst prediction is supported by the observation of
increased activity in the rOFG whenever third-parties
severely punished outgroup members who defect against
cooperating ingroup members and strongly reduced activ-
ity in the same brain region whenever ingroup members
were punished far less for the very same norm violation.
The lateral OFG, and in particular the rOFG, are brain
areas shown to be associated with negative evaluation
processes [Kringelbach, 2005; Liu et al., 2007; Rilling et al.,
2007; Seymour et al., 2007; Spitzer et al., 2007]. The
strongly increased activation of rOFG during the punish-
ment of outgroup defectors is consistent with the view
that third-parties evaluate outgroup members’ defective
behavior more negatively than ingroup members’ defec-
tion. Moreover, we also ﬁnd that the evaluation-related
area in the rOFG mediates the effective connectivity
between the two other areas in the rLPFC and rCaudatus
that are activated whenever third-parties strongly punish
outgroup defectors. These ﬁndings suggest that the stron-
ger the negative evaluation of outgroup defection, and the
stronger the associated activation of rOFG, the stronger
the functional connectivity between the two areas known
to be involved in implementing the punishment behavior.
In other words, a strong negative evaluation of outgroup
members’ defective behavior might trigger a cascade of
functionally connected neural processes which enable
third-parties to implement a more costly punishment by
down-weighting their own economic self-interest and
motivating the punishment act. Further evidence for this
interpretation is provided by the observation that the
strength of punishment of defecting outgroup members
depends on the functional connectivity between the rOFG
and rLPFC. The stronger these areas are functionally con-
nected, the stronger outgroup members are punished for
Figure 7.
Connectivity analyses between the mentalizing-network and pun-
ishment-network. We applied Physio-Physiological Interaction
(PPI) analyses using the DMPFC and lTPJ as seed regions in
order to reveal the effective connectivity between the two net-
works shown to orchestrate the parochial nature of altruistic
norm enforcement. Findings revealed evidence (at P < 0.005,
voxel extent threshold: 10 voxels) that the lTPJ modulates the
effective connectivity between the DMPFC and (A) the evalua-
tion system in the lateral (BA 10/11, left: x ¼ 42, y ¼ 54, z ¼
9; right: x ¼ 24, y ¼ 60, z ¼ 6, depicted in blue) and medial
OFG (BA 10/11, x ¼ 15, y ¼ 45, z ¼ 9, depicted in red) as
well as (B) the cognitive control system in the rLPFC (BA 45/
46, x ¼ 54, y ¼ 36, z ¼ 15, depicted in blue). In detail, medial
areas of the OFG (depicted in red) show an enhanced positive
connectivity with the DMPFC whenever the lTPJ is strongly acti-
vated. In sharp contrast, lateral areas of the OFG and the rLPFC
(depicted in blue) show an enhanced negative connectivity with
the DMPFC whenever the lTPJ is strongly activated. These
highly distinctive connectivity effects in medial and lateral areas
of the OFG support our hypothesis that a justiﬁcation process
in the mentalizing network might change the evaluation of
ingroup members’ defective behavior (making it less negative
and/or more positive). Notably, the negative connectivity effects
are localized in neighboring and overlapping areas of the punish-
ment-network depicted in Fig. 3 and 4. In order to visualize this
spatial proximity, the same activity (depicted in yellow) and posi-
tive connectivity patterns (depicted in red and violet in the
zoom view of Fig. 7B) are shown here. We in particularly want
to point out (see zoom view in Fig. 7B) that the negative con-
nectivity effect in the rLPFC (in blue) is localized in the same
area showing an enhanced positive connectivity with the rOFG,
whenever third-parties strongly punish defecting outgroup mem-
bers (depicted in violet, overlap depicted in dark violet). For dis-
play purposes all activation and connectivity patterns in (A) and
(B) are depicted at P < 0.01, except for the zoom view in (A)
on which the patterns are depicted at P < 0.05.
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committing a norm violation against cooperating ingroup
members.
The data also supports our second prediction that the
much lower punishment of ingroup members is associated
with activation of brain regions associated with mentaliz-
ing processes because we ﬁnd increased activity in the
DMPFC and bilateral TPJ when the third parties face an
ingroup defector (compared with an outgroup defector). If
third-parties attempt to understand the intentions or goals
behind ingroup members’ defective behavior because they
try to ﬁnd mitigating reasons that provide an excuse for
ingroup defectors, we would expect the activation of
DMPFC and TPJ because these two brain regions are key
components in the mentalizing network known to be
involved in inferring temporary goals, intentions, desires,
as well as more enduring dispositions of others [Gallagher
and Frith, 2003; Hampton et al., 2008; Mitchell et al., 2005;
Steinbeis and Koelsch, 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009]. Our
connectivity ﬁndings both within the mentalizing network
and between the mentalizing and the punishment network
corroborate the hypothesis that the mentalizing regions
modulate punishment behavior. First, the functional con-
nectivity of two areas of the mentalizing network (DMPFC
and left TPJ) depends on third-parties’ punishment deci-
sions. More precisely, the less third parties punish ingroup
defectors, the stronger is the functional connectivity
between these two key areas of the mentalizing network.
Second, the same two areas of the mentalizing network
Figure 8.
Summary: The analysis of the neural underpinnings of the paro-
chial nature of altruistic norm enforcement revealed the follow-
ing activity and connectivity pattern. First, the increased
punishment of defecting outgroup members is associated with
increased activity in a functionally connected network of brain
areas involved in punishment-related decision processes (red
circles and red lines with arrows). Second, the stronger the con-
nectivity within areas of this punishment network, the stronger
defecting outgroup members are punished (violet lines with
arrows). Third, the reduced punishment of ingroup members’
defective behavior is associated with increased activity in the
mentalizing network of the brain, suggesting that third-parties
try to understand and justify ingroup members’ defective behav-
ior (blue circles). Fourth, the stronger the connectivity within
areas of this mentalizing network, the less third-parties punish
defecting ingroup members (orange lines with arrows). Fifth, the
analysis of connectivity between the punishment and mentaliz-
ing/justiﬁcation network suggests that the mentalizing/justiﬁca-
tion process reduces the punishment behavior by modulating
the activity in areas of the punishment network associated with
negative evaluation processes (rOFC) and the assignment of an
appropriate punishment level via the weighting of economic-self-
interests (rLPFC, blue lines with arrows).
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(DMPFC and left TPJ) show a connectivity pattern with
areas of the punishment network, suggesting that mental-
izing-related activity reduces the punishment behavior by
modulating the activity in evaluation-related (rOFG,
mOFG) and control-related areas of the lateral PFC
(rLPFC). More precisely, the neural data suggest that the
left TPJ negatively modulates the effective connectivity
between the DMPFC and lateral areas of the PFC (rOFG,
rLPFC), whereas the left TPJ positively modulates the
effective connectivity between the DMPFC and medial
areas of the OFG known to be involved in positive evalua-
tion processes [Hare et al., 2009; Kringelbach 2005]. Thus,
the lower punishment of ingroup members’ defective
behavior may have been implemented via the modulatory
role of left TPJ on evaluation related prefrontal areas such
as mOFG and rOFG.
The lack of mentalizing-related brain activity and the
associated increased punishment in situations when out-
group members commit the norm transgression are partic-
ularly interesting in light of a recent publication [Harris
and Fiske, 2006]. In this study, participants saw images of
different outgroups which varied in dimensions of compe-
tence (high or low) and warmth (high ¼ friend, low ¼
foe). Crucially, the mentalizing network only failed to be
activated if participants faced extreme outgroups, i.e., peo-
ple who were both low in competence and low in warmth
(e.g., homeless people, drug addicts). The authors inter-
preted this lack of mentalizing-related activated as an indi-
cation that extreme outgroups may not be perceived as
fully human, may even be dehumanized by denying char-
acteristics to them that are uniquely human (representing
them as animal-like) and those that constitute human na-
ture (representing them as objects or automata) [Allport,
1954; Haslam, 2006]. This lack of activity in areas of the
mentalizing network in both studies permits the specula-
tion that the defecting outgroup members of our paradigm
are treated similarly to the extreme outgroup members in
the study by Harris and colleagues. In this context, it is
important to remember that our outgroup does not consist
of extreme outgroup members such as homeless people or
drug addicts. Instead, the characteristics of the outgroup
and ingroup members are identical; all are ofﬁcer candi-
dates in the Swiss army, there are no signiﬁcant differen-
ces in education or age, and the assignment to the
different platoons/groups was random. Thus, the ﬁnding
that the extreme outgroups (e.g., homeless people and
drug addicts) and the defecting outgroup members of our
study evoke a similar activity pattern in the mentalizing
network (i.e., no increased activity compared with base-
line) further illustrates the strong impact of parochial
altruism on neural activations.
Finally, we would like to point out that some of our
interpretations (e.g., negative evaluations in the rOFG and
mentalizing in the DMPFC and bilateral TPJ) rely on
assumptions about speciﬁc cognitive functions subserved
by these brain regions in the type of behavioral paradigm
we implemented. If we had complemented our neuroi-
maging and behavioral punishment data with subjective
ratings or judgments, these assumptions could have been
further strengthened. For example, if we had asked sub-
jects about their mentalizing processes, we would have
been able to clarify more precisely whether the increased
activity in the mentalizing network indicates an overabun-
dance of mentalizing leading to increased justiﬁcation for
ingroup members or rather a deﬁcit in mentalizing for out-
group members leading to decreased justiﬁcation. How-
ever, despite this limitation of the study, we would like to
emphasize that no assumptions about speciﬁc cognitive
functions subserved by these brain regions are necessary
to render the results of our paper interesting and impor-
tant because no other paper has yet identiﬁed the activity
and connectivity patterns associated with parochial norm
enforcement (please check summary of the results below).
Summing up, this study is the ﬁrst to reveal the neural
circuitry of the impact of parochial altruism on social
norm enforcement. To study this prevalent psychological
phenomenon, we applied a third-party punishment para-
digm with manipulation of group membership using real
social groups, the involvement of real monetary stakes,
and the requirement to curb immediate self-interests in
order to enforce social norms. We found (1) that third-par-
ties’ higher punishment of defecting outgroup members is
associated with increased activity and connectivity in a
functionally connected neural network involved in punish-
ment-related decision processes, including the rOFG,
rLPFC, and right dorsal caudatus. Furthermore, (2) the
functional connectivity between two areas of this punish-
ment network predicts third-parties’ punishment of defect-
ing outgroup members. More precisely, the stronger the
rOFG and rLPFC are functionally connected, the more
severely outgroup members are punished for defecting
cooperating ingroup members. In sharp contrast, (3) the
lower punishment of defecting ingroup members is associ-
ated with increased activity in brain areas well-known to
be involved in mentalizing processes (including the
DMPFC and bilateral TPJ), as if third-parties tried to
understand the underlying intentions and goals behind
ingroup members’ defective behavior. The conjecture that
the mentalizing network modulates punishment is corro-
borated by the ﬁnding that (4) the functional connectivity
between two areas of this mentalizing network (DMPFC
and left TPJ) is related to the punishment of ingroup
defectors in a particular way: the stronger the connectivity
between these two areas, the less third-parties punish
ingroup defectors. Finally, (5) the functional connectivity
between areas of the mentalizing (DMPFC and left TPJ)
and punishment network suggests that the reduction in
punishment is associated with the modulation of the neu-
ral activity in the right orbitofrontal gyrus and right lateral
prefrontal cortex, i.e., in the same areas showing enhanced
activity and connectivity whenever third-parties strongly
punished defecting outgroup members. The neural ﬁnd-
ings of this study thus provide evidence for the view that
humans have developed elaborate neural circuitry for
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social cognition that modulates the parochial nature of
altruistic norm enforcement—a prevalent psychological
phenomenon that has shaped humans’ cooperative, altruis-
tic, and punishment-related behavior in decisive ways.
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